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Prague to Kabul 
The Soviet Style of Invasion 
Jiri Vulentu 
I T h e  Soviet invasions 
in 1979 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968 are both examples of I '  
the Soviet determination to intervene militarily in neighboring countries 
when their communist governments become, in the Soviet view, untrust- 
worthy and unable to maintain control. Whereas Czechoslovakia belongs 
inside the traditional Soviet security belt of Eastern Europe and had been a 
communist country for more than two decades, Afghanistan, a third world 
Muslim country, is part of Asia and has had a ruling Marxist party only since 
1978. 
There are striking similarities between the official Soviet rationale for these 
interventions. The arguments advanced in both cases were rather confused 
and contradictory, ranging from a claim that the USSR responded to a call 
to "assist healthy forces" to claims that military action was needed to put 
down an imminent "counterrevolution" and prevent the countries' potential 
defection to the imperialist camp. In Czechoslovakia, this threat was sup- 
posedly posed by the imperialist bloc, primarily the CIA in the United States, 
neighboring West German "revanchists," and "Zionists." In Afghanistan, 
the United States was again implicated, as were Egypt and neighboring 
Pakistan and China. After both invasions, the Soviet leadership concluded 
treaties providing for the "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops in the 
occupied countries which, at least in the case of Czechoslovakia, has been 
permanent. 
This essay seeks to assess the similarities and differences, primarily on the 
political level of Soviet decision-making, but on a militaw level as well, 
between the two invasions. What were the motives? How did domestic 
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interests and foreign policy and strategic considerations affect the final de- 
cisions? What influence, if any, was exercised by an altered military balance? 
What other factors shaped the decisions? What was the nature of the de- 
ployments? What have been the consequences of the invasions? 
Soviet Perceptions of lnstabilities and Failing Reliabilities 
The decisions to intervene in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan had many 
motivations, the most important being Soviet perceptions of both regimes’ 
instability and unreliability . Domestic and strategic considerations followed. 
In the Soviets’ view, Alexander DubZek and Hafizullah Amin were charting 
independent courses in domestic politics in disregard of Soviet counsel, and 
future developments in both countries were as unpredictable as they were 
dangerous. 
However, the situations at the time of the respective invasions differed 
considerably. Under Dubhk, the Czechoslovak Communist Party had pur- 
sued for several months a pluralistic concept of socialism in a developed, 
Central European country with predominantly democratic traditions. Under 
the leadership of Noor Mohammed Taraki and later Amin (after the coup of 
September 1979) on the other hand, the Khalq (People) Marxist Party had 
pursued for more than a year a radical, but also oppressive and brutal 
program of socialization in an underdeveloped, Muslim country having no 
experience or history of democracy. Taraki, and Amin to an even greater 
extent, both disregarded Soviet counsel to broaden their bases of support. 
In Czechoslovakia in 1968, revolutionary changes had taken place peacefully. 
In Afghanistan, civil war and a series of bloody coups were the prelude to 
change. In both Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, political developments 
were characterized by factional struggle. In Czechoslovakia, pro-Soviet, an- 
tireform-oriented leaders, led by A. Indra and V. Bil’ak struggled against 
Dubc‘ek and his reformist supporters. In Afghanistan, Khalq party leaders 
Taraki and Amin struggled against the more pro-Moscow Parcham (Banner) 
faction led by Babrak Karmal. As shown below, factional struggles and Soviet 
attempts to exploit them by organizing pro-Soviet coups were synchronized 
with the military interventions. 
In Czechoslovakia the Soviets faced, using Soviet terminology, a serious 
“right-wing deviation.’’ In Afghanistan, by contrast, they were challenged 
by a radical, even Maoist “left-wing deviation.” Despite significant differ- 
ences, both developments were viewed by the Soviets as having unpredict- 
able and dangerous consequences. In Czechoslovakia the Soviets feared that 
DubCek‘s consolidation of power at the forthcoming Fourteenth Party Con- 
gress in September 1968 would be followed by a more independent foreign 
policy-with Czechoslovakia becoming, in effect, a ”second Yugoslavia.” In 
Afghanistan, however, the chief worry was that Amin would turn traitor. 
Given their difficult experience with other fervent though independent com- 
munist and third world leaders (such as Josif Broz Tito, Mao Zedong, and 
Anwar Sadat) the Soviet leaders were eager to oust the radical yet unreliable 
Amin who seemed to be “following the same path as Egyptian President 
Sadat.” 
The situation in Afghanistan was viewed as being even more perilous than 
the situation in Czechoslovakia. Amin’s regime, despite increasing Soviet 
military assistance (including, since the spring of 1979, T-62 tanks, MI-24 
assault helicopters, and MIG-23 fighter planes) and the presence of between 
three and four thousand Soviet advisors, was unable to suppress the growing 
resistance of the Muslim rebels. This was in spite of the advisors’ assumption 
of command and control responsibilities down to company-level posts and 
operation of jet fighters and helicopter gunships. In the fall of 1979 the rebels, 
with some cover assistance coming from Pakistan and China, had succeeded 
in repelling Amin’s offensive and were effectively in control of most of the 
countryside. The Afghan army, having suffered mutinies and massive de- 
sertions to the rebels, was slowly deteriorating. Meanwhile the Soviet advi- 
sors themselves bore heavy casualties. In this situation Amin’s greatest lia- 
bility in Soviet eyes was that he not only was likely to become a 
“counterrevolutionary” taitor but also a loser, who might decide in a des- 
perate moment to seek rapprochement with the West or China. Indeed, 
Amin refusd to visit Moscow in November and reportedly sent frantic 
requests in November and early December for an immediate meeting with 
Pakistan’s General Mohammed Zia.3 
The immediate challenge to Soviet interests in Afghanistan was the overall 
political-military situation, particularly the instability in late November 1979. 
1. Jiri Valenta, Soviet Zntmention in Czechosluvakia, 1968: Anatomy o f a  Decision (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 134-139. 
2. V. Sidenko, ”Undeclared War on Afghanistan,” Pravda (Moscow), February 5, 1980. Also see 
V. Sidenko, ‘Two Years of the Afghan Revolution,“ New Times, April 25, 1980, pp. 18-25, and 
a letter of the Director of Oriental Studies Ye. Prmakov and Zzvestia’s political observer A. Bovin, 
L’Uniti, April 25, 1980, and interviews with Soviet analysts. 
3. “Amii reportedly appealed to Zia,” Washington Post, February 14,1980, and interviews with 
former Afghan officials. 
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Soviet inaction at this time could have led to growing chaos and the over- 
throw of the Khalq regime in Kabul or even Amin's no-recourse shift to a 
more pro-Western or pro-Chinese foreign policy alignment. Moreover, Soviet 
inaction could have had repercussions in Eastern Europe, in the third world, 
and perhaps in the Soviet Union itself. As explained by two prominent Soviet 
writers: "At the end of 1979, the situation became critical . . . We could not 
and did not want to betray our sense of responsibility. The USSR could not 
have acted otherwise. It could not allow a victory by religious fanatics" . . . 
nor tolerate the "counterrevolutionary ignominy" of Amin's group. 
Security Considerations: Spillover Effects 
The invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan were also motivated by 
more direct security considerations. Propaganda that intervention was in 
response to Western military threats (in the case of Czechoslovakia) or mil- 
itary threats from the West and China (in the case of Afghanistan) was used 
largely to create bureaucratic and public support jushfymg the Soviet action. 
More genuine were the Soviets' fears about instability on their own borders. 
In Czechoslovakia the Soviets were concerned with the possible effects of 
Prague reformism-a kind of proto-Eurocommunism-on the intellectual, 
scientific, and literary communities and liberal-minded members of the Soviet 
establishment. Such liberal-minded members had begun, albeit in limited 
numbers, to advocate that the Prague Spring should serve as "an example" 
for the Soviet Union to follow. This point was made most persuasively by 
Academician A. Sakharov in a manifesto urging the Soviet leadership to 
adopt some portions of the Czechoslovak reformist programs. More ominous 
were the possible effects on the non-Russian Soviet republics. Soviet leaders 
have always been extremely sensitive about nationalist trends. Thus in 1968 
they feared that "deviate" ideas of reformism and, more importantly, Dub- 
Cek's experiments with federalization, would spill over from Czechoslovakia 
to encourage nationalism not only in the Ukraine, but perhaps also in Lith- 
uania, Latvia, and Estonia. The threat seemed to be particularly serious in 
the Ukraine, especially in the western portion, part of which had belonged 
to the Czechoslovak province of Ruthenia during the inter-war period. Prior 
to the intervention there were indications that the Czechoslovak experiment 
with federalization, the restoration of national rights to the Ukrainian mi- 
4. Rimakov and Bovin, L'UniP, April 25, 1980, op. cit. 
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nority living in Slovakia, and the revival of the forbidden Greek Catholic 
church were also encouraging Ukrainian national sentiment. The Czechoslo- 
vak media-Ukrainian language broadcasts and newspapers-publicized 
these ideas and even occasionally criticized the situation in the Soviet Union. 
In spite of Soviet denials, similar fears were almost certainly among the 
motives for the invasion of Afghanistan. That the Soviets are as concerned 
about the loyalty of ethnic groups in the non-Russian republics in the East 
as in the West became obvious with the advent of growing militancy among 
Islamic fundamentalists in Iran in 1978-79 (and to a lesser degree in Turkey 
and Pakistan) and Muslim insurgency in Afghanistan in 1979. 
Muslim fundamentalism in Iran and Afghanistan did not have concrete 
repercussions upon the Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus as 
had Dubhk’s federalization on the Ukraine. Moreover, we do not have any 
evidence of significant Muslim dissidence in Soviet Central Asia or of the 
impact of Muslim fundamentalism. Yet, as James Critchlow has noted, the 
Soviet Muslims in Central Asia, mainly the Turkic and Iranian peoples, 
“share proximity and historical experience’’ with respect to the bordering 
Muslim countries. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tadjikistan share over 800 
miles of borders with Afghanistan. The Soviet Muslims ”have had extensive 
opportunities to interact with co-nationals in the Afghan population, which 
consists of four million Uzbeks and three million Tajiks, plus smaller but 
significant numbers of Turkmens.” Some of these are descendents of anti- 
Soviet Basmachi guerrillas who escaped from the USSR in the 1920s after 
having lost their ten-year struggle against Soviet hegemony in Central Asia 
in the 1 9 2 0 ~ . ~  This is particularly true of the Uzbeks, who constitute a majority 
of the population of northern Afghanistan. To be sure, there was no evidence 
of widespread sympathy among theMuslims in Soviet Central Asia for either 
the rebels or for Amin’s regime in Afghanistan. Yet it is intriguing to note, 
as Critchlow discovered, that the September 1979 account of the Afghan 
revolution-written by the Uzbek editor of the widely circulated literary 
journal Sharq yulduzi, who visited Afghanistan in March-pictured the pro- 
5. James Critchlow, ”Minarets and Marx,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1980, pp. 47-57. In 
my discussion of the Central Asian Muslim factor, I benefited immeasurably from consultations 
with Critchlow. I also consulted essays by S. Enders Wimbush, Alexandre Bennigsen, and 
Steven L. Burg in Survey, Summer 1979, pp. 36-82; Alfred J. Di Maio, ”The Soviet Union and 
Population: Theory, Problems and Population Policy,” Comparative Political Studies, April 1980, 
pp. 97-136; and Helen Carrere d’Encausse, Decline of the Soviet Empire: Soviet Republics in Revolt 
(New York Newsweek Books, 1979). 
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Soviet leader of Parcham Babrak Karma1 as an untrustworthy villain and 
Hafizullah Amin as a hero.6 
Any impact of Muslim insurgency or Amin’s nationalism and search for 
independence upon the USSR was not immediate but rather very remote. 
One must consider long-term demographic, economic, religious and cultural 
trends to understand the Soviet leadership’s concern about the potential 
spillover effects of the Muslim religious movement.’ 
Strategic Considerations: The Brezhneu Doctrine? 
The Soviet moves into Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia must be seen in the 
light of global strategic as well as domestic considerations. In the aftermath 
of both interventions, analysts tried to explain events in terms of the so- 
called Brezhnev doctrine, which was presumably inaugurated with the 1968 
invasion. According to this “doctrine,” the Soviet Union has the right to 
intervene in any communist country in order to safeguard established so- 
cialism. Although some of the ideological pronouncements after both inva- 
sions were similar, this explanation gives too much credit to Brezhnev’s 
contributions to Soviet foreign policy. Russian Csars and Soviet leaders alike 
have traditionally been sensitive about the security of nearby countries. They 
have used force to restore “stability” and maintain or bring into power 
friendly, pro-Russian or pro-Soviet regimes. Since World War I1 these have 
been the reasons for three interventions: East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 
1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968. On one level, Afghanistan is just another 
example of an old habit. However, Soviet interventions in dissenting com- 
munist countries are neither automatic nor foreclosed. Although coming very 
close, the Soviets did not intervene in Yugoslavia after the break with Tito 
in 1949, nor in Poland during the upheavals in 1956 and 1970. Nor did they 
intervene on a large scale in 1969 during and after the conflict with the PRC 
on the Ussuri River. As the Czechoslovakia and Afghan cases illustrate, 
Soviet decisions to use force in international relations are motivated by a 
number of factors besides the doctrinal statements of Soviet writers and 
6. Mirmuhsin (Mirsaidov), “Chodrali ayal (Woman with Veil), ” Sharq yulduzi No. 10, 1979, 
p. 67. Here I am indebted to Critchlow, ibid, pp. 54-57. 
7. See the analysis of a leading Soviet demographer V. Perevedentsev, Literatumaia gazeta, 
October 3, 1979, and the analysis “Training Cadres from the Local Population in the Central 
Asian Republics,” Voprosy ekonomiki, May 1979. For preliminary results of the population census, 
see Pravda, April 22, 1979. 
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communist theoreticians, which serve more as ex post fact0 justifications than 
as real motives. 
Contrasts: Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan 
There were however, some striking differences between the two invasions. 
Whereas in Czechoslovakia the Soviet intervention was limited strictly to the 
defense of the status quo, the invasion of Afghanistan seems to have con- 
tained defensive and offensive elements. Afghanistan is the first country 
outside the East European security zone in which the Soviets have intervened 
since World War II. It upset the unwritten rules of the superpower game. At 
the same time, however, Russian Csars and Soviet Commissars alike have 
traditionally considered the northern tier of Afghanistan to be within their 
sphere of influence. Also from Russian tradition is the difficulty in knowing 
where to draw a line to expansion.8 The Russians intervened in Afghanistan 
on a limited scale in 1885, 1928 and 1930. (In the 19th century, British fear of 
and desire to halt Russian expansionism were the motives behind two costly 
Anglo-Afghan wars.) Yet the Russians never attempted a full-scale invasion 
of Afghanistan until 1979. 
Although the initial reason for the invasion of Afghanistan was almost 
certainly not to secure a base for further interventions in Iran or Baluchistan, 
one cannot simply isolate the defensive from the offensive motivations. It 
was neither an exclusively defensive move (as believed by George Kennan) 
nor a solely offensive move (as viewed by Richard Pipes), but rather a 
combination of both.9 Only Vernon Aspaturian and Edward Luttwak have 
seemed to understand fully the dual nature of the invasion. l o  Soviet concerns 
must be viewed in light of the strategic position of the Persian Gulf, partic- 
ularly in the wake of the U.S. deployment off the coast of Iran in November 
1979. In addition to any defensive motives was the Soviet desire to be in a 
better position to exploit future opportunities in unstable Iran. The Soviet 
deployment in Afghanistan would cut in half the distance from their own 
8. See my discussions, ”Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Difficulty of Knowing Where to 
Stop,” ORBZS, Summer 1980, and Baltimore Sun, February 19-22, 1980. 
9. See an interesting debate between Richard Pipes and George Kennan in “How Real is the 
Soviet Threat?”, U.S. News 8 World Report, March 10, 1980, p. 33. 
10. See Vernon V. Aspaturian, “Moscow’s Afghan Gamble,” The New Leader, January 28, 1980, 
pp. 7-13, and Edward N. Luttwak, “After Afghanistan, What?” Commentary, April 1980, 
pp. 4049. (In spite of this concurrence I would differ with some of Luttwak‘s conclusions.) 
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borders to the Straits of Hormuz. Soviet land-deployed aircraft in Afghani- 
stan would be in a more advantageous position, should they be needed, to 
neutralize U.S. air power superiority provided by the naval aviation of U.S. 
aircraft carriers in the area. The Soviets would in effect be able to cope with 
all likely contingencies in Iran, including U.S. military intervention and/or 
civil war and greater chaos. 
Furthermore, foreward deployment in Afghanistan would enable the So- 
viets to improve their strategic position vis a vis neighboring Pakistan and 
China, creating a more effective buffer and, if necessary, a source of pressure. 
The Afghan frontier is believed to be close to Chinese missile sites in Sin- 
kiang. The Soviets feared that the fall of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan 
might have been manipulated by the United States and China,” the Soviets 
maintained that the United States was attempting to ”drive” Afghanistan 
into the “notorious strategic arc” which the United States “has been building 
for decades close to the USSR’s southern borders.” l2 
Decision-making: Conceptualization 
Studies of Soviet decision-making are necessarily tentative, since they de- 
pend heavily on personal interpretations of cryptic and incompletely known 
communications within the Soviet bureaucracies. It is impossible to capture 
all the complexities of the Soviet decision-making process. 
Soviet decision-makers can be at once tough and flexible, and they share 
a similar Marxist-Leninist Weltanschauung. Yet the Politburo is a collective 
body which rules without a supreme authority such as a president. It is 
composed of a group of men with divergent values, bureaucratic affiliations, 
constituencies, and responsibilities. Decisions made by the Soviet collective 
leadership do not always reflect united sets of national security interests. 
They appear to be taken also in relation to a variety of inconsistent goals for 
internal and external policies, arising from participants with many differing 
personal and organizational interests. 
The hypotheses of bureaucratic politics can offer a tentative, if partial 
explanation of how Soviet decisions are made. Under the conditions of 
collective leadership in the post-Stalin era, the major Soviet decisions have 
been made following debates at Politburo sessions where senior decision- 
11. For this point, see an interview with Primakov, Liferaturnaia gazeta, March 13, 1980. 
12. Ye. Shaskov, “Milestone in the Struggle for Peace,” Smefskaia rossiia, January 4, 1980. 
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makers often express, in the Soviet idiom, ”different points of view.” The 
Politburo debate is aimed at reaching a consensus-in Soviet political ter- 
minology, a ”unanimous point of view.” Although most Soviet decisions are 
compromises, they are taken unanimously in order to preserve the unity and 
cohesion of the Politburo. 
Unfortunately, analysts have little information about the decision-making 
process preceding the invasion of Afghanistan. Whereas with Czechoslovakia 
it was possible to demonstrate that the Soviet decision was influenced by 
coalition politics, in the Afghan case we have only very limited evidence of 
the existence of any pre-invasion debate. Available evidence suggests it did 
occur, although it was certainly not as arduous and prolonged as the debate 
preceeding the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet leaders had 
been concerned with the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan at least since 
the spring of 1979 when, according to Soviet sources, the late president 
Taraki began to ask them repeatedly for military aid.l3 Amin, who came to 
power in September, also reportedly asked for help, but, as First Deputy 
Chief of the Central Committee’s International Department, V. Zagladin 
pointed out, ”he did not expect us to comply with such a request.”14 This 
is plausible, as is the fact, again pointed out by V. Zagladin, that the Soviet 
Union did not respond to calls for military aid until December because 
”moving troops into the territory of another state is always a difficult matter.” 
The Soviet leadership must “carefully” view ”all aspects and interrelation- 
ships” of such a move. l5 As Secretary General Brezhnev himself pointed 
out, the decision to intervene “was no simple decision.”16 Indeed, as another 
Soviet official, the authoritative commentator Bovin, frankly elaborated, it 
was “a very difficult decision.” 1’ 
The Soviet decision-making style has been affected by many changes in 
domestic and international politics since Czechoslovakia. The most important 
change is the considerable strengthening of Brezhnev’s power and his ability 
to outmaneuver, dismiss, demote or retire several of his colleagues (P. She- 
lest, G. Voronov, A. Shelepin, K. Mazurov and N. Podgorny being good 
13. An interview with V. Falin, first deputy chief of the International Information Department, 
and V. Zagladin, first deputy chief of the International Department of the Central Committee 
of the CPSU, Stern, January 31, 1980. 
14. h i d .  
15. aid. Also see a speech of a secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, V. Dolgikh, 
Akahata (Tokyo), March 1, 1980. 
16. Brezhnev’s statement, New York Times, January 3, 1980. 
17. Corriere della Sera (Milan), April 2, 1980. 
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examples in the 1970s). The basic mode of Soviet decision-making probably 
has not altered drastically, however. As an astute observer of politics in 
communist countries V. Kusin pointed out, the bureaucratic politics para- 
digm probably still applies in 1980 except that “the inputs in terms of the 
specific weights of the various political actors and political considerations 
have changed.” The most notable changes in the Soviet decision-making 
style since 1968 have been this enhancement of Brezhnev’s power, as well 
as the growing influence of his secretariat led by Alexandrov Agentov. 
Brezhnev, unlike Stalin, is not the final arbiter in Soviet decision-making. 
Still, he is primus inter pares in the ruling oligarchy-what the Soviets call 
collective leadership. In the last few years, however, during which his health 
has deteriorated remarkably, Brezhnev sometimes does not participate in the 
work of the Politburo, a factor which could lead to an increasing number of 
debates and policy conflicts. 
Falin, first deputy chief of the International Information Department of the 
Central Committee, stated ”all our foreign policy and national security ques- 
tions must be discussed and decided in the Politburo.” l9 Clashes over dif- 
ferent policy positions occur in the various bureaucracies before the issues 
are submitted to the highest decision-making body. The senior decision- 
makers try to avoid disagreements, ”often aggravated by poor contact,” as 
Falin notes, and most of these are overcome by the time the issues reach the 
Politburo. Yet debate and disagreements still do occur while the Politburo, 
usually chaired by Brezhnev, carefully examines the pros and cons of the 
various policy options and tries to smooth over the existing differences by 
consensus-building. This ultimately leads to unanimous approval of a course 
of action, and was very likely the process adhered to in Soviet decision- 
making on Afghanistan. 
The Soviet Debate 
The Soviet debate regarding Afghanistan and neighboring Iran reached a 
peak in late November. It was not as intense as the one preceeding the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia. Unlike 1968, there was neither an intense media 
18. See V. Kusin’s essay review of my book, “How Moscow Decides to Invade,” Inquiry, May 
19. An interview with Fal i  by H. Branden, ”How Decisions Are Made in the Highest Soviet 
Circles,” Washington Star, July 15, 1979. 
5, 1980, pp. 25-26. 
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debate nor reports about a serious division in the leadership. While at that 
time, one could detect the pressures on the Politburo in favor of the invasion 
by the leadership of the Soviet non-Russian republics in the West (particu- 
larly the head of the Ukrainian Party, P. Shelest), these pressures did not 
exist or were well hidden in 1979. Two meetings of the Central Committee 
of the CPSU during which Czechoslovakia was debated occurred before the 
1%8 invasion. Such meetings probably did not take place prior to the inva- 
sion of Afghanistan.20 
As in the decision-making process on Czechoslovakia, however, one can 
speculate on the influence of information and policy recommendations pro- 
vided by high-ranking Soviet military officials and diplomats. Army General 
A. Epishev, head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet armed 
forces (MPA), who is concerned mainly with ideological and political super- 
vision of the Soviet military, had toured Czechoslovakia before the 1968 
invasion and was concerned about the weakening morale in the Czechoslo- 
vak armed forces. He subsequently became one of the most outspoken ad- 
vocates of the military intervention. 21 Epishev also toured Afghanistan in 
April 1979 with half a dozen other Soviet generals. Later, on November 23, 
Epishev called upon Soviet servicemen to be “on the alert” and to approve 
and support “our states’ new foreign policy initiative,” made necessary 
because “aggressive imperialist circles and the Beijing leaders who form an 
alliance with them” oppose the USSR and strive to ensure their “military 
~uperiority.”~~ After the invasion, Epishev would defend it as a just, defen- 
sive action, declaring that “All the wars our state and its armed forces have 
been constrained to wage have been just wars.” 23 
During October and November, the Soviet generals and the Soviet am- 
bassador to Afghanistan came to view developments in that country as 
20. There was a meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU on November 27,1979 at which 
some of the spokesmen who delivered talks were from Central Asia and Transcaucasia-first 
secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party S. Rashidov and first secretary of the Azerbaidjan 
Communist Party G . Aliyev. According to a Soviet source the meeting was devoted exclusively 
to economic problems and, indeed, there is no evidence it was otherwise. Moscow Radio, 
November 27, 1979. 
21. According to reliable sources, Epishev reportedly made the first interventionist appeal in 
April 1968, when he suggested that if the “healthy forces” in Czechoslovakia (pro-Soviet 
elements in the Soviet lexicon) called for ”fraternal assistance” against “counterrevolution,” 
the Soviet Army would do its duty. Valenta, Swiet  Intervention in CzPchoslwakia, 
22. Komsomol’ skaia pravda (Moscow), November 23, 1979. 
23. A. Epishev, “Loyalty to Lenin’s Banner,” Krasnaia me&, February 22, 1980. 
p. 22. 
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extremely volatile and unstable. Unlike in Czechoslovakia, where senior 
Soviet policymakers and key military figures alike were intensively engaged 
in management of the crisis, in Afghanistan the main role was played by 
representatives of the military. Key Soviet military personnel who amved in 
Afghanistan a few months prior to the invasion very likely concurred in a 
generally pessimistic assessment of the situation. 24 Besides Epishev, Deputy 
Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces 
General I. Pavlovskii (who, incidentally, was commander in chief of the 
invading Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia in 1968) paid a two-month visit to 
Kabul, from late August until October. His reports very probably concluded 
that the regime was slowly disintegrating and that a few thousand Soviet 
advisors would not be able to stabilize the situation. It is probable that 
Pavlovskii, Epishev, and other Soviet generals, mainly those in charge of the 
military districts adjacent to Afghanistan, urged a massive intervention to 
assist pro-Soviet elements to stabilize the restive southern borders and put 
an end as quickly as possible to the killing of Soviet advisors. There was, as 
explained by the commander of the Turkestan Military District Colonel-Gen- 
era1 Yu. Maksimov and other Soviet generals of military districts in Central 
Asia, ’a real seat of war danger on the USSR’s southern border.” In the view 
of Maksimov, “the presence of our troops will permit the stabilization of the 
situation in Afghanistan, will allow the democratic forces to consolidate 
themselves and the gains of the revolution to be secured, and will permit 
the cooling of the ardor of those who initiated military adventures.” ”The 
Soviet soldiers” in Afghanistan, Maksimov declared, ”are fulfilling their 
noble international mission.”25 
The Soviet leaders also rely on information from diplomatic sources about 
political developments in other countries. The importance of the activities 
24. See the explanation of a high Soviet official, “Wegen Afghanistan gibt es keinen Krieg,” 
Der Spiegel, January 28, 1980, pp. 88-89. 
25. Colonel-General Yu. Maksimov, “Mighty Guard of Socialist Achievements,” Pravda 
mstoku (Tashkent), February 21,1980. For similar views see Lieutenant-General V. Rodin, chief 
of the Political Directorate of the Turkestan Military District, “Guarding Socialist Achieve- 
ments,” Turkmenskaia iskra (Ashkhabad), February 23, 1980; and Lieutenant-General 
V. Gorchakov, first deputy commander of the Central Asian Military District, ”Always with the 
People,” Smietskaia Kirgiziia, (Frunze) February 23, 1980. Although most of the speeches by 
politicians on the invasion were also tough, they lacked the emphasis given by some military 
leaders to such ideas as ”noble mission,” “just wars,” and “stabilization of the situation.” See, 
for example, the speech of the head of the International Department and a secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU, B. Ponomarev, Pravda, February 5, 1980. A main thrust of his 
speech seemed to be to convince the United States that the invasion of Afghanistan ”in abso- 
lutely no way affects U.S. state interests.” 
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and reports of S. Chervonenko, Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia during 
the Czechoslovak crisis, indicates that the notion prevailing among analysts 
that Soviet diplomats are merely "messenger boys of the Kremlin" may not 
be entirely true. Chervonenko's opinion that Czechoslovakia could become 
a "second Hungary," his exaggerated reports about "counterrevolution," 
and his intimate relations and support for the nascent anti-Dubc'ek faction 
were important factors in the final decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia. 
Such Dubc'ek supporters as the Czechoslovak leader J. Smrkovsky asked 
(to no avail) that Brezhnev recall Chervonenko because they were aware of 
his role and knew that he had provided inaccurate information to the Soviet 
Politburo.26 There is less information available about the role of the Soviet 
ambassador to Afghanistan A. Puzanov during the 1979 crisis. Nevertheless, 
circumstantial evidence suggests some similarities. Amin, like the Czecho- 
slovak reformers, requested that the Soviet leadership recall Puzanov. Like 
Chervonenko, Puzanov got involved in factional struggles, plotting against 
Amin. He also provided sanctuaries for anti-Amin forces at the Soviet em- 
bassy after the coup against Taraki in September 1979. Unlike Chervonenko, 
Puzanov was recalled on November 8 and replaced by F. Tabaiev, a Tatar 
Muslim by nationality and formerly the first secretary of the Tatar Obkom. 
According to some reports, Puzanov, who by now must have felt rather 
bitter about Amin, was one of the reliable consultants the Soviet leaders 
"listened" to before they made the final decision to intervene.27 
One can reasonably assume that the Soviet leadership, at the apparent 
suggestion of key military figures and Ambassador Puzanov, was considering 
two alternatives: allow events to develop on their own and be faced with the 
unpredictable, whereupon the Soviets could lose strategic gains in Afghan- 
istan (as they had in Egypt and Somalia); or take drastic measures to stabilize 
the course of events in Afghanistan on both a military and political level. 
Soviet leaders responsible for foreign diplomacy might have feared the 
adverse impact of a full-scale military response in Afghanistan on their 
relations with the West, the third world, and the international communist 
movement. Possibly Kosygin and even Brezhnev questioned the wisdom of 
a military invasion. It cannot be excluded that, because of their failing health, 
they might not even have been present at the crucial Politburo deliberations. 
26. For a detailed treatment see Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, pp. 123-28. 
27. Radio Madrid, January 10, 1980. Puzanov's role was also discussed on Radio Beijing, 
November 7, 1979. Here I also benefited from interviews with former officials of the Afghan 
government. 
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Kosygin was hospitalized, presumably for a heart attack, in mid-November. 
And in view of Brezhnev’s failing health, which permits him to work only 
two or three hours a day, and his bad bout with a cold in early December 
1979, a select group was reportedly formed within the Politburo-including 
representatives from each of the most important bureaucratic elites (the KGB, 
the armed forces, the International Department, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs)-to deal with the emergency in Afghanistan on a day-to-day basis.28 
Yet it is very unlikely that the decision to intervene was taken without 
Brezhnev and Kosygin’s consent, or that they were overruled. From what 
we know about Soviet decision-making, it is unthinkable that the secretary 
general might be overruled without this having significant repercussions on 
his position. As Brezhnev explained in 1968 to one Czechoslovak reformist 
leader, ”If I had not cast my vote in the Politburo in favor of military 
intervention, what do you suppose would have happened? Certainly you 
would not be sitting here. And perhaps men I would not be sitting here either!”29 
As during the debate on Czechoslovakia in 1968, both probably joined in the 
final Politburo consensus that argued in favor of the invasion. 
As occurred following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev was the 
first Politburo member who, after a period of official silence, attempted to 
justify the invasion in a major public speech. Former Politburo member and 
present Soviet ambassador to Japan, D. Polianskii, described the final deci- 
sion-making on Afghanistan in the following manner: 
Decisions are made collectively, and in no case is a decision made individ- 
ually. Questions are carefully discussed, but final decisions are made with 
unanimity. The decision on the dispatch of Soviet troops to Afghanistan was 
made in accordance with this practice. . . . The debate on this question was 
not easy. But the final decision was adopted with unanimous approval.30 
Soviet Risk Assessment: The Perceived U. S .  Response 
The shift of the Politburo in favor of the invasion most likely came in late 
November in response to the pessimistic reports from Afghanistan, new 
developments in Iran, and assessments of consequences for the Soviet Union 
of events in these two countries. As in 1968, one of the most important 
28. An interview with Soviet historian R. Medvedev, Corriere della Sera, February 4, 1980. 
29. Valenta, Soviet lntervention in Czechoslovakia, p. 144 (my emphasis). 
30. An interview with D. Polianskii, Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), March 8, 1980. 
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points in the debate was the assessment of the risks involved, particularly 
the U.S. response to the invasion and the general nature of U.S.-Soviet 
relations. 
By the time the decision was made to invade, the Soviet leaders had 
reached very pessimistic conclusions about their relations with the United 
States and China. In late November it became clear that the Soviet Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the International Department was going to be unsuc- 
cessful in detering the United States and other NATO countries from their 
decision to modernize Europe’s theater nuclear forces. In addition, the Carter 
Administration’s decision to deploy the new MX and Trident ICBMs, to 
increase defense spending significantly, and to create a Rapid Deployment 
Force (RDF) were viewed by the Soviet as indicative of a new and dangerous 
course to the Soviets. The SALT I1 agreement was in trouble, either heading 
for indefinite postponement or doomed altogether. The Soviets concluded 
by the fall of 1979 that there were hardly enough votes in the U.S. Senate 
for its ratification and that the ”hard-liners” in the Carter Administration 
were willrully opposing it. Even President Carter, according to Falin, had 
”done everything to sabotage the agreement.”31 In Brezhnev’s view, the 
Carter Administration’s actions had proved the United States to be “an 
absolutely unreliable partner.” 32 
Similarly, Soviet relations with China had deteriorated further as a result 
of the punitive Chinese invasion of Vietnam in early 1979 which infuriated 
and embarassed the Soviets. Moscow’s hoped-for rapprochement with the 
post-Mao leadership had become even more unlikely as Chinese aid to the 
Afghan rebels increased slightly following Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping’s visit 
to Washington in January 1979. Moreover, in October the Carter Adminis- 
tration had indicated it would do away with its evenhanded policy for dealing 
with Peking and Moscow and had proposed granting most favored nation 
trade status to China. The visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
(essentially intended to signal U.S. displeasure with the presence of a Soviet 
brigade in Cuba), announced in late October and planned for January 1980, 
was viewed by authoritative Soviet analysts as a step toward ”quasi-allied 
relations” with China.33 
~ 
31. An interview with Falin, Stem, op. cit. 
32. New York Times, January 13, 1980. 
33. V. B. Lukin, “Washington-Beijing: ‘Quasi-Allies’?“ Ekonomika, politika, ideologiia, November 
12, 1979. pp. 50-55. 
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More important were developments in the area of the Persian Gulf and 
the Arabian Sea. The attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the seizure 
of American hostages on November 4 was followed by U.S. deployment of 
21 ships, including two aircraft carriernthe strongest American presence in 
the area since World War 11. For the Soviets, the events in Iran, accompanied 
as they were by reports about the U.S. quest for military facilities in the 
region, were a deliberate pretext for an American military buildup.34 Hints 
by President Carter and other American officials in late November and early 
December compounded the threat of a possible U.S. military intervention in 
Iran. The unpredictability of developments in Iran posed a serious dilemma 
for the Soviet Union. The view that probably prevailed in the Kremlin how- 
ever, was that the USSR would not risk too much by intervening in Afghan- 
istan, since U.S. policymakers were too preoccupied with Iran to be able to 
formulate an effective response to a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In short, 
there was nothing significant to fear and nothing significant to be gained 
from the United States. Because of the November heart attack of Georgy 
Arbatov, head of the prestigious Institute for the U.S.A. and Canada, a 
crucial role in estimating the American reaction was probably played by 
Soviet embassy personnel in the United States, particularly Ambassador 
Anatolii Dobrynin, who was recalled unexpectedly to Moscow on December 
10 when final preparations were being made for the invasion. The United 
States was distracted in Iran as it had been during the Suez crisis in 1956 
when the Soviets invaded Hungary and during escalation of the Vietnam 
war in 1968 when the Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia. American hes- 
itancy and preoccupation with Iran, as well as previous U.S. vacillation 
during the Cuban "mini-crisis" in September 1979-when an "unacceptable" 
Soviet combat bridgade suddenly became acceptableprobably served as 
another powerful argument to the Soviet decision-makers who argued in 
favor of the invasion. 
The intervention could not be further delayed. "The Soviet leaders," as 
Andrei Sakharov put it, "chose this moment to act because, with the United 
States preoccupied with Iran and other problems, they judged the correlation 
of military and political forces to be in their favor." All factors considered, 
as Sakharov pointed out, "the Soviet policymakers may have decided it was 
now or never."35 
34. Krasnaia m a d a ,  December 2, 1979, and Pravda, December 5, 1979. 
35. New York Times, January 3 ,  1980. 
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Planning the lnvasion and the Coup 
As in Czechoslovakia, contingency planning for the invasion of Afghanistan 
by the Soviet General Staff began at least several months prior to the inva- 
sion. In fact, the airlift to Kabul was perhaps even practiced by a fleet of 
Antonov 22s in late August, when reportedly 10,000 troops plus military 
supplies were transported from the USSR to South Yemen and Ethiopia and 
back to the USSR. In September the Soviets undertook the first attempt to 
influence developments in Afghanistan by military force. When Taraki visited 
Moscow in that month, Pravda reported on September 13 that he was assured 
that he could “rely on the all-around” assistance of the Soviet Union, which, 
in Soviet language, includes military support. Taraki was also reportedly 
warned about Amin and, as some former Afghan government officials have 
reported, the Soviets arranged a meeting between Taraki and Parcham’s 
Karmal during Taraki’s visit to Moscow. Upon Taraki’s return to Kabul, the 
Soviets appear to have organized and/or supported an anti-Amin coup on 
September 14-15, their objective being to establish a Khalq-Parcham coalition 
government led by Taraki and Karmal. At this time there was a reported 
attempt, with some yet unexplained involvement of Ambassador Puzanov, 
to assassinate Amin. Concurrently, the Soviets deployed some airborne units 
on the Soviet-Afghan borders and a 400-man airborne unit to the important 
Bagram air base 40 miles from Kabul. The coup was a failure and instead of 
Amin, Taraki was removed from power and subsequently murdered by 
Amin’s officers, who used pillows to smother him.36 The Soviets decided to 
accept this as a fait accompli, at least for the time being, since they had no 
other alternative. The Soviet decision to intervene on a massive scale as a 
means to overthrow Amin, however, seems to have been reached only in 
late November-according to one report, on November 26.37 This speculation 
can be supported by circumstantial evidence. 
First in early December, Soviet diplomats began to implement a new policy, 
promising Iranian officials unspecified “support” in the case of U.S. military 
intervention. In early December, the Soviets also began to warn the Carter 
Administration that any military action in Iran would carry grave conse- 
q u e n c e ~ . ~ ~  By offering their support to Tehran, the Soviets appeared to be 
36. A1 Wutun, Al-Arubi (Pans) in Near East-North Africa Report, June 11, 1980, and interviews 
with Afghan refugees. 
37. Radio Madrid, January 10, 1980, op. cit. 
38. Pruvdu, December 10, 1979. 
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trying to induce the Khomeini regime not to release the hostages, thereby 
assuring the United States’ continued distraction with Iran. By issuing a 
warning, the Soviets also appeared to be trying to manipulate the United 
States into a drawn-out deployment that would stop short of the actual use 
of force. 
But Amin, who was rumored to have complained in the fall of 1979 about 
Taraki’s warning to ”sell out the country to the Russians,” apparently de- 
clined to follow the Soviets’ new pro-Khomeini tactical line. That the Soviet 
leadership had decided or was deciding to get rid of him at this time, at least 
politically, is suggested by various references to “left-wing extremists” in 
Afghanistan and omissions of any reference to Amin in some reports in the 
Soviet media.39 At the same time, Radio Moscow significantly changed its 
broadcasts to Afghanistan, where Amin was resented by the Muslim clergy; 
the broadcasts now ended with the invocation “God protect us.”40 Another 
bit of evidence that the Soviets had decided to dispose of Amin was the 
decision of November 28 to send First Deputy Minister of the Interior Lieu- 
tenantxeneral Victor Paputin to Kabul. His official mission was to help 
Amin with police affairs and counter-insurgency, perhaps even to protect 
him; yet in reality he was to prepare the coup by mobilizing Amin’s oppo- 
nents among Taraki’s and Karmal’s supporters. 
As in Czechoslovakia in 1968, prior to the invasion, Soviet security officials 
and diplomats tried to exploit factional struggle to their advantage and to 
prepare the way for a new pro-Soviet government. In Czechoslovakia, as in 
Afghanistan, the Soviet strategy was to establish a government which would 
make an orderly call for Soviet assistance, thereby legitimizing the Soviet 
invasion. In Czechoslovakia they had tried to rally antireformist elements- 
mainly those leaders who had objected to Dubc‘ek‘s reforms and were grad- 
ually being dismissed or feared dismissal at the forthcoming party congress. 
In Afghanistan, under the direction of Puzanov in September and Paputin 
in December, they tried to rally members of Parcham and some Khalq mem- 
bers (Taraki’s supporters) in an effort to overthrow Amin. Karma1 was living 
in Czechoslovakia. He and other exiles in Eastern Europe or underground in 
Afghanistan were activated already in November-December, if not earlier, 
39. L. Mironov’s reports in Pruvdu, December 11 and 13, 1979. In contrast, other Soviet reports 
were favorably quoting Amin at that time. See, for example, Turkmenskuiu iskru, December 9, 
1979, but also Pruvdu, December 8, 1979. 
40. Toronto Globe and Mud, December 13, 1979. 
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while Soviet secret service men, under the direction of General Paputin, 
apparently made final preparations for the coup. This may explain the shoot- 
ing in Kabul on December 19 in which an unidentified assailant shot and 
killed Hafizullah Amin’s nephew Assadullah and slightly wounded the pres- 
ident. Replacement of Amin, which, according to a Soviet source, was sup- 
posed to be carried out in the middle of December, was subsequently post- 
poned until December 27.41 
Other evidence that the decision to intervene was made in late November 
is provided by changes in Soviet military deployment along the Afghan and 
Iranian borders. U.S. intelligence was not surprised by the Afghan invasion, 
as it was by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In late November U.S. intelli- 
gence detected the mobilization of Soviet troops in Turmenistan and in other 
areas along the Afghan borders. Local reserves were being called up. In early 
December, analysts noticed a military buildup on the Afghan borders when 
some Soviet forces and tactical aircraft were shifted from the Iranian frontier. 
On December 8 and 9, airborne units of over 1,000 men, equipped with tanks 
and artillery, were airlifted to the Bagram airfield, where they were able to 
reinforce the Soviet units deployed there in September. The mission of this 
unit became clear during the invasion when it began handling incoming 
flights and clearing the Russian-built highway between the Soviet border 
and Kabul. Concurrently, the Soviets airlifted a number of small units into 
the Kabul municipal airport. Also, in early December a number of high-level 
consultations occurred, involving the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact officials 
along with the commanders of the military districts bordering Iran and Af- 
ghanistan. At the same time, several Western embassy attaches in Moscow 
were denied permission to visit Soviet Central Asia. 
Military Doctrine and Capabilities 
The invasion of Afghanistan was planned to be a smooth, effective operation 
based on surprise. This had also been the case in Czechoslovakia. Soviet 
military doctrine has long emphasized the surprise attack in military opera- 
tion, aimed at preventing any effective counteraction by the opponent. After 
Khrushchev’s fall, some Soviet generals also began to emphasize the concept 
of gibkoe reagirovanie (flexible response). Those who believed that Soviet mil- 
41. P. Demchenko, “Afghanistan: Guarding the People’s Gains,” Kommunist, Nov. 5, March 
1980, pp. i7-78. 
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itary doctrine does not exclude limited, non-nuclear warfare and who at the 
same time advocated this concept were generals with backgrounds in the 
Soviet Ground Forces, such as Generals I. Iakubovskii and S. Shtemenko 
and Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces General Pavlovskii. All three, 
incidentally, were among the most outspoken advocates of the Soviet inva- 
sion of Czechoslovakia. 
The Soviets had learned an unforgettable lesson from the German attack 
on the USSR in 1941 and from other World War I1 German military opera- 
tions. The Soviet generals probably also learned a lesson from their experi- 
ence in Hungary in 1956-where two armored divisions used in the first 
military intervention were not sufficient, and the second intervention re- 
quired the deployment of ten divisions-and perhaps from the U.S. experi- 
ence with gradual escalation in Vietnam. They knew that a military inter- 
vention must be an efficient, rapid, and overwhelming action to be 
successful. It was, in fact, shortly before the invasion of Czechoslovakia that 
studies began to appear in such Soviet military journals as the authoritative 
Voiennaia mysZ (Military Thought) of the Soviet General Staff, which addressed 
the issue of “surprise attack” iq modem warfare as ”one of the main factors 
which insures victory in a battle or ~ p e r a t i o n . ” ~ ~  This greater emphasis on 
flexible response and surprise reflected, in part, the growing Soviet military 
capabilities, particularly air- and sea-lift. 
Stressed in particular was the growing role of the airborne forces and 
military transport aviation in surprise military operations. As Lt. Gen. A. 
Sopil’nik stated in 1968, “Military Transport Aviation (VTA) has been resup- 
plied with new types of planes which have great payload capacity, speed, 
altitude, and range of flight. These planes can transport not only personnel, 
but also heavy combat equipment.” Because of the existence of new air force 
capabilities (an obvious reference to the An-22 aircraft introduced in 1963, 
airborne troops can be employed in new kinds of offensive missions. Said 
Airborne troops are able to successfully accomplish not only operational, but 
also major strategic missions in a modem war. The success of airborne 
operations, as in the years of World War 11, will depend on air supremacy, 
reliable neutralization of means for antiaircraft defense, surprise, and massive 
employment of airborne landings. . . . The significant increase in the mobility 
sopil’nik: 
42. Major-General N. Vasendin and Colonel N. Kuznetsov, ”Modem Warfare and Surprise 
Attack,” Voiennaia mysl, Nov. 6, 1968, pp. 4248. 
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and combat capabilities of airborne forces allows them to carry out inde- 
pendent operations without any connection with the ground forces, in the 
deep rear of the enemy, and to conduct decisive offensive  operation^.^^ 
A very illustrative example of a Soviet operation based on flexible response 
and surprise was the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Here the Soviet 
blitzkrieg operation succeeded in capturing the capital of Prague and other 
vital centers on August 20-21, 1968 while at the same time Soviet Ground 
Forces units, along with a few Polish, East German, and Hungarian divisions 
and a brigade of Bulgarians were moving from the borders along strategic 
highways and railroads toward vital centers: the capital, the big cities, and 
important communications centers. The story of Czechoslovakia in 1968 re- 
peated itself in 1979 on a lesser scale, but in an even more daring and bold 
fashion. 
Deception, Deployment, Coup 
The actual invasion of Afghanistan was scheduled for December 24-26, dur- 
ing the Christmas holidays when most Western officials would not be avail- 
able. As in Czechoslovakia, the plan was to surprise and replace the existing 
regime in a short time and thereby prevent any strong, organized defense. 
There were tactical deceptions a few days before both invasions. In 1968, the 
Soviet generals succeeded in lowering fuel and ammunitions stocks of the 
Czechoslovak army by transferring these to East Germany, supposedly for 
an ”exercise.” They also secured the consent of the Czechoslovak Ministry 
of Defense for an unexpected military exercise of the Czechoslovak armed 
forces, with the participation of Warsaw Pact observers. The exercises were 
to take place on August 21, the second day of the invasion, a maneuver to 
divert the attention of the Czechoslovak generals from the forthcoming in- 
vasion. In Afghanistan, the Soviet advisors disarmed two Afghan armored 
divisions (one of them garrisoned in Kabul) by convincing their commanders 
to hand over their ammunition and anti-tank weapons for inventory and 
their tank batteries for wintering, while retiring some tanks to repair depots 
for the correction of a supposed defect.44 The Afghan leaders, like the lead- 
ership in Czechoslovakia, apparently failed to anticipate the invasion. 
As many as 200 flights of An-l2s, An-22s and L 7 6 s  landed in Kabul on 
43. Lieutenant-General A. Sopil’nik, “Airborne Landings in World War 11,” Voiennaia mysl, 
Nov. 8, 1968, pp. 63-74 (my emphasis). 
44. The Times (London), January 9, 1980 , and Newsweek, January 21, 1980, p. 115. 
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December 24-26, deploying 10,000 Soviet airborne units of the 105th Airborne 
Guards Division. Two mechanized divisions drove down from the north, 
advancing toward the capital and other vital centers. In both invasions, the 
Soviets at first did not try to seal the borders with adjacent Western countries, 
fearing defections and an enlargement of the conflict. Control of the borders 
was left to a later stage. In several days the Soviets had deployed at least 
80,000 combat troops to Afghanistan in a surprising, bold, and speedy in- 
vasion. (In Czechoslovakia the invading forces were estimated to number 
from 200,000 to 500,000.) The 1968 invasion was hampered when the logistical 
system broke down at several points and the invading forces were handi- 
capped for several days by a lack of food, water, and fuel, sufficient supplies 
of which had not been brought in with the troops. By 1979, in contrast, the 
Soviets displayed more efficiency and even more self-confidence in the op- 
erational abilities of their troops. 
A political coup d'etat accompanied both invasions. Amin, like Dubc'ek, 
refused to give his official approval. We do not know if the Soviets asked 
him to legitimize the invasion or whether Amin was supposed to be only 
demoted and not killed. Whether, as the Soviets profess, Amin's death was 
not their doing but the work of Afghans, or whether it was a "coincidence" 
or error is ~nc lea r .~s  Thus far it is also not possible to establish whether 
Babrak Karma1 returned secretly to Afghanistan several weeks prior to the 
coup, as the Soviets say.46 It is much more likely that he returned with the 
invading forces in a well-planned and well-executed coup. 
In both cases the invasions were legitimized only ex post fucto and super- 
ficially. However, there were some significant differences. In Czechoslovakia, 
the political coup began with the arrest of Dubc'ek and his faction and ended 
when the Soviets were unable to establish a new "revolutionary government 
of workers and peasants" led by Dubc'ek's rival, the antireformist Indra. In 
a short-lived compromise, the Soviets had to let Dubc'ek and his supporters 
return to power after their brief abduction. He was forced to resign in April 
1969, under the threat of yet a second Soviet invasion. In Afghanistan, Soviet 
actions were more expedient and more brutal due to Amin's decision to resist 
forcefully Soviet arrest.47 He reportedly gave instructions to his officers to 
fight the Russians should they try to take his palace on the outskirts of Kabul. 
45. V. Sidenko, "Two Years of the Afghan Revolution," op. cit., pg. 23; April 1980, and The 
Christian Science Monitor, March 31, 1980. 
46. hid . ,  pp. 22-23. 
47. An interview with a commander of the 4th Tank Brigade of the Afehan Armv. Lt.-Col. 
. / I  
Alawoddin, Radio Moscow, January 16, 1980, and intervieGs with Afghanurefugees. 
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On December 27, a special Soviet assault unit, probably led by General 
Paputin and perhaps some Afghans, attacked Amin and his supporters who, 
unlike DubZek, refused to surrender. Amin died after a few hours of fierce 
battle. In turn, General Paputin himself mysteriously died during or after the 
assault amidst rumors that he committed suicide in Moscow after the inva- 
sion. 48 Whereas in Czechoslovakia the antireformists Indra and Bil’ak-iso- 
lated, fearful, and without political support-were hesitant to establish a 
new revolutionary government, in Afghanistan, where the Soviets appeared 
to act more boldly and brutally, the transition was much smoother. On 
December 27 Karma1 took over, declaring that the “healthy forces” in Af- 
ghanistan had asked for “fraternal aid.” 
lmpact and Lessons 
It is impossible after less than a year to estimate the long-term impact of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But it seems already to have had a more 
profound effect than the invasion of Czecho~lovakia.~~ The 1968 invasion 
had its most lasting effects not on East-West relations but on the communist 
movement as a whole, contributing to a deepening of the split with China 
and encouraging the emergence of ”Eurocommunism.” It did not signifi- 
cantly alter the general pattern of the East-West relationship because the 
West correctly interpreted the 1968 invasion as a purely defensive and re- 
active move (like the invasion of Hungary in 1956), aimed primarily at pre- 
serving political stability in Czechoslovakia, Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. 
The invasion of Afghanistan was a different story. Although it was not an 
integral part of an offensive to control the Persian Gulf, nor were the Soviets 
pulled involuntarily into Afghanistan for reasons of defense. The 1979 in- 
vasion was probably seen in Moscow as a defensive move, but unlike the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, it had at least some offensive elements with 
serious implications for the United States. The invasion of Afghanistan chal- 
lenged the perceptions of American policymakers regarding Soviet inten- 
tions. It called into question the Soviet perception of detente and Soviet 
48. The only certain knowledge is that Paputin is dead, since there was an obituary marking his 
death in Pravda, January 3, 1980. 
49. Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, pp. 160-64. 
50. For a discussion, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, Jiri Valenta and David Burke (eds.), Eurocom- 
munism between East and West (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980). 
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intentions in the vital areas surrounding the Persian Gulf and the Arabian 
Sea. 
Only several months after the invasion, the sum of political costs had 
proven to be quite high in terms of Soviet relations with the West and the 
third world, particularly the Islamic nations, and vis a vis the international 
communist movement. Although only time will test its resolve, President 
Carter's response was much firmer than that of Lyndon Johnson in the wake 
of the Czechoslovak crisis. 
Czechoslovakia's failure to actively resist Soviet forces, coupled with the 
Soviet use of maximum force and minimum violence, helped to keep political 
costs low, certainly much lower than expected. In Afghanistan, both of these 
factors were missing. The Afghans, unlike the Czechs and Slovaks, resisted 
and continue to do so. The rebels' thus far viable resistance is due in part to 
the fact that the Soviets did not use a maximum amount of force-only 80,000 
to 100,000 troops as opposed to the 200,000 to 500,000 deployed in Czecho- 
slovakia. The Afghan rebels are exceedingly poor and risk no material loss 
through a bloody and destructive war, as, for example, would a highly 
developed, industrialized country such as Czechoslovakia. Their only wealth 
is their tribal freedom; thus their traditional resistance to invaders and to 
attempts by the central government in Kabul to impose order on the coun- 
tryside. The Soviets continually suffer casualties as a result of this type of 
warfare-rebel sniper attacks, ambushes of Soviet units, etc., and the muti- 
nies of the disintegrating Afghan Army. Gradually the personnel of the 
Soviet armed forces and Soviet civilians have had to take over many admin- 
istrative functions from Karmal's government, which is still engaged in bitter 
infighting with the Khalq faction, amidst unconfirmed reports about Karmal's 
suicide. There is a likelihood that Afghanistan, unlike Czechoslovakia, will 
continue to be a source of trouble for the Soviet Union. 
According to one Soviet source, 1,500 notifications of death for Soviet 
soldiers in Afghanistan were sent out at the beginning of Februa~y.~' As of 
early May 1980, the total number of casualties (killed and wounded) since 
the invasion began in December was estimated to be about 4,000 to 7,000.52 
This number is to be compared with the estimated 50 to 100 soldiers who 
51. As reported by D. Fisher, "The Coffins of Russians Killed in Afghanistan Are Arriving in 
the USSR in the Hundreds," France Soir (Pans), March 11, 1980. See also Newsweek, February 
25, 1980, and New York Times, April 21, 1980. 
52. Newsweek, May 26, 1980. 
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died during and shortly after the Czechoslovak invasion (mainly due to 
accidents) in 1968, the estimated several hundred Soviet soldiers who died 
during the invasion of Hungary, and the several dozen advisors who were 
killed in Angola in 1975-76 and Ethiopia in 1977-78, where the major combat 
was carried on by Cuban soldiers. The Soviets have tried to maintain secrecy 
about the ongoing war in Afghanistan. But, unlike a decade ago, when 
Western broadcasts to the East were jammed after the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, today they transmit unimpeded. Soviet citizens are able to 
find out many unpleasant details about the military involvement in Afghan- 
istan. Fearing demonstrations, the Soviet officials reportedly have decided 
to deliver the coffins to the families at night and have the funerals, to be 
privately attended only by the closest relatives, take place secretly in the 
mornings.53 
Any Soviet “normalization” of Afghanistan will cost the USSR enormous 
effort, many lives, and, most important, time. The Soviet war machine has 
run into some difficulties in the months following the invasion, although not 
the kind of logistic failures encountered in Czechoslovakia. First, it has 
become obvious that some 80,000 troops, with 30,000 to 40,000 more in 
reserve on the Soviet borders with Afghanistan, may not be able to stabilize 
the country. Soviet training and military hardware are more relevant for 
fighting in Central Europe than for waging protracted low-intensity warfare 
against loosely organized forces numbering 50,000 to 100,000 in a country of 
260,000 square miles and some 2800 miles of frontiers. The mountainous 
terrain and the lack of an airlift network and military bases has inhibited 
fixed-wing jet aircraft and the deployment of tanks and heliborne gunships. 
Furthermore, tight control is exercised by higher headquarters over field 
units. Soviet junior officers are not trained to make battlefield decisions or 
to be flexible. Because they have not fought since 1945, they are inexperienced 
in protracted warfare. They are vulnerable to desertion, low morale, and 
disciplinary problems. This is particularly true about the soldiers of Central 
Asian origin, many of whom were originally deployed in Afghanistan. (Be- 
cause of reported refusals to fight the Afghans, most of these troops were 
replaced by Russians or withdrawn to the barracks after the invasion.) Soviet 
military doctrine, as illustrated in the Czechoslovak and Afghan invasions, 
53. F. Barbieri, ”Now the Russians Know There Are no Afghan Brothers,” La S t u m p  (Turin), 
March 2, 1980, and V. Jarc, ”The USSR after Afghanistan: A Test of Firm Nerves and Policy,” 
Delo, April 30, 1980. 
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is tailored to deception, surprise, and speed, and less to sustained, anti- 
guerrilla operations. 
Though it is unlikely that Afghanistan will become the Soviets’ Vietnam, 
the Soviets may find themselves in a situation similar to that of the Germans 
in Yugoslavia during World War 11, holding the cities and roads but unable 
to control the countryside. To win the war, the Soviets would have to either 
seek a political solution or escalate their deployment in an all-out effort to 
subdue the Afghans. The Russians have been accustomed historically to 
years of prolonged and bloody military operations in Asia. Yet the decision 
that must be made at this writing regarding Afghanistan may be causing 
consternation. According to reports, the future course of the war in Afghan- 
istan has touched off a division of opinion within the Politbur0.5~ 
The lesson to be drawn is that Soviet military invasions can be responses 
to what the Soviets believe are dangerous developments and/or attractive 
opportunities in countries located in geographic proximity to the USSR as 
well as in strategic areas of the third world. Yet Soviet military interventions 
in such situations are not automatic or foreclosed. They occur after a delib- 
erate process of weighing the pros and cons of such actions. As studies of 
both the Czechoslovak and Afghan invasions (as well as the military inter- 
ventions in Hungary in 1956, Angola in 1975, and Ethiopia in 1977) illustrate, 
factional struggles and divisions in the leadership, political instability, and 
calls for assistance by pro-Soviet groups within a country are factors that 
encourage Soviet leaders to decide in favor of military assistance. 
Soviet perceptions of possible U.S. responses are central to calculations of 
risks involved in the use of military force. The Czechoslovak and Afghan 
examples, together with many others, suggest that U. S. policymakers should 
be aware that their sometimes unconscious signals are influences in the 
Kremlin’s deliberations. Heavy U. S. involvement in Vietnam, accompanied 
by the well-advertised noninvolvement policy regarding Czechoslovakia very 
likely helped the interventionists prevail in the Soviet debate in 1968. True, 
U.S. intelligence was not as surprised by the invasion of Afghanistan as it 
was in 1968, when U.S. intelligence lost track of Soviet combat troops that 
were conducting maneuvers around the Czechoslovak borders and found 
them again when their tanks rolled through the streets of Prague, but only 
by way of Czech radio news  broadcast^.^^ During the Afghan crisis, U.S. 
54. U.  S .  News and World Report, March 31, 1980. 
55. Valenta, Soviet lntemention in Czechoslovakia, pp. 2 3 .  
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intelligence monitored the movement of combat troops before the invasion 
and the U.S. expressed concern to Moscow in March, in early August, and 
in early December.56 Yet U.S. preoccupation with the hostage crisis since 
early November was so intense that it prohibited any strong response. Vac- 
illation in previous crises in the late 1970s (the Soviet-Cuban use of force in 
Africa in 1975-76 and in 1977-78, as well as the Soviet combat brigade ques- 
tion in September-October 1979) may have assisted the interventionists in 
the Soviet debate on Afghanistan. The crucial turning point during the 
Afghan crisis was the seizure of the American hostages in early November. 
U.S. failure to respond promptly with firm measures, including the use of 
military force, and the subsequent agonizing over the crisis were unlikely 
additional factors in the Politburo assessment of the cost and benefits of the 
invasion. 
There is little, however, that the United States can do to directly influence 
any particular Soviet decision on the use of force. The outcome of the Soviet 
decision-making process is mainly determined by events beyond the control 
of U.S. policymakers. Yet if any lesson can be drawn from the Czechoslovak 
and Afghan military interventions, it is that U.S. policymakers should try to 
avoid the well-advertised noninvolvement of 1968 or any tendency to vacil- 
late as happened before the Afghan invasion. Indecision, weakness, and 
division of opinion are signs readily interpreted and skillfully exploited by 
the Soviets. The contradictory signals and policies, improvisation, and lack 
of coordination coming from Washington in 1976-79 were harmful to U.S. 
interests. Confrontation should be sought only in extreme cases and when 
American leaders are prepared, as during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, 
to back words with deeds. Both invasions suggest that it is better to say as 
little as possible, and to even let the Soviet leadership guess about possible 
U.S. responses, than to be inconsistent. Incoherent policies leave the Soviets 
with the impression that the United States is neither a formidable rival nor 
a reliable partner. 
U.S. policymakers should not ignore some of the arrogant pronouncements 
of Soviet officials about the global right of the USSR to intervene on behalf 
of its clients. Chervonenko, Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia in 1968 
and currently ambassador to Paris, declared in April 1980 that the USSR 
“has the full right to choose its friends and allies, and if it becomes necessary, 
to repel with them the threat of counterrevolution or a foreign interven- 
56. Washington Star, December 13, 1979. 
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t i ~ n . ” ~ ~  Chervonenko also declared that no region in the world, including 
the Persian Gulf, can be viewed as a special area of vital interest to the 
United States. Another spokesman, L. Zamiatin, acknowledged that the 
Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan not merely because of defensive 
reasons, since the USSR’s vital interests in this area are in no way less than 
the United States’ vital  interest^.^^ Do Chervonenko and Zamiatin’s state- 
ments reflect new sentiments in the Soviet capital in the wake of the Afghan 
invasion? Whether the USSR will implement such hard-line policies will 
depend to some degree on the determination of U.S. decision-makers, draw- 
ing appropriate lessons from past cases of Soviet interventions, to discourage 
and, if necessary, obstruct, the influences that favor such undertakings. 
57. Vernon V. Aspaturian, “The Soviet Union as a Global Power: Soviet Perceptions of the 
Changing Correlation of Forces,” Problems of Communism, April-May 1980, and N m  York Times, 
April 27, 1980. 
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